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Implementation frameworks and theories acknowledge the role of power as a factor in the adoption (or
not) of interventions in health services. Despite this recognition, there is a paucity of evidence on how
interventions at the front line of health systems confront or shape existing power relations. This paper
reports on a study of actor power in the implementation of an intervention to improve maternal, neonatal
and child health care quality and outcomes in a rural district of South Africa.
Methods
A retrospective qualitative case study based on interviews with 34 actors in three ‘implementation units’ –
a district hospital and surrounding primary health care services – of the district, selected as purposefully
representing full, moderate and low implementation of the intervention some three years after it was  rst
introduced. Data are analysed using Veneklasen and Miller’s typology of the forms of power – namely
‘power over’, ‘power to’, ‘power within’ and ‘power with’.  
Results
Multiple expressions of actor power were evident during implementation and played a plausible role in
shaping variable implementation, while the intervention itself acted to change power relations. The ability
to mobilise collective action (power with) was a key dimension of successful implementation, but
potentially poses a threat to hierarchical power (power over) at higher levels of the system, affecting
sustainability.
Conclusions
A systematic approach to the analysis of power in implementation research may provide insights into the
fate of interventions. Intervention designs need to consider how they shape power relations, especially
where interventions seek to widen participation and responsiveness in local health systems.
Contributions To The Literature
This paper provides insights into the role of actor power in the implementation of health service
interventions based on qualitative research with health system actors in a rural district of South
Africa;
The analysis applies a framework that considers power as both enabling and constraining
implementation and examines different forms of power that include hierarchical power (‘power
over’), the power of collective action (‘power with’), and the agency of individual actors (‘power
within’);
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The paper documents how these forms of power shape implementation, and conversely how health
service interventions themselves shape power relations.
Background
Theories of implementation, whether from the  eld of policy or implementation science acknowledge the
central roles of actors, as individuals and groups, in the adoption of health service interventions. In May’s
Normalization Process Theory (1), implementation is a “process, in which agents intend to bring into
operation new or modi ed practices that are institutionally sanctioned, and are performed by themselves
and other agents.” Similarly, the Promoting Action on Research Implementation in Health Services (i-
PARIHS) framework emphasizes “groups or teams of individuals [as having] an important role in
determining the uptake of new knowledge in practice.” (2). Actors play different roles in implementation –
amongst others, they can be managers and champions as drivers, brokers and boundary spanners as
enablers, external facilitators as catalysts, or frontline providers as targets of intervention (3, 4).
A key attribute of actors is that they have agency, de ned as the capacity to “in uence … others with
predictable or unpredictable consequences for implementation” (3). Agency stems from the interaction of
actor values, interests and power and is revealed in how actors adopt, adapt or resist new organisational
strategies, even if these are handed down as formal decisions in hierarchies (4). Agency can be expressed
at all levels of the system – from leaders of change to ‘street level bureaucrats’ who are not in positions
of authority but who exercise considerable ‘discretionary power’ (5).
This paper explores the phenomenon of actor power in implementation. The exercise of power in health
systems is often taken to mean the dynamics of coercion and resistance (6), such as between managers
and workers, and the governance mechanisms that address assymetries of power (7). However, power
can also be understood as a positive force, as proposed by Veneklasen and Miller (8) who de ne power
as “an individual, collective, and political force that can either undermine or empower citizens and their
organizations. It is a force that alternatively can facilitate, hasten, or halt the process of change… its
expressions and forms can range from domination and resistance to collaboration and transformation.”
In such a differentiated approach, power emanates from a variety of sources. Apart from overt political,
 nancial (economic) and bureaucratic power, it also resides in professional status and gender norms, and
in the knowledge power associated with technical expertise and research, able to shape preferences and
discourses (9). These sources are, in turn, expressed in different forms of power, characterised by (8) as
power over (political, economic, hierarchical etc.), power to (knowledge, skills, experience), power within
(individual agency and psychological capacity to resist internalisation of discrimination) and,  nally,
power with (forms of collective action able to engage or challenge other forms of power). The ability of
actors to function collectively, in particular, is considered vital to implementation: adopting and
assimilating new guidelines, processes or systems requires cooperation and collaboration in the ‘local
social orders’ of the health team, the facility or the district (1, 10, 11).
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In their review on the role of power in health systems, Sriram et al. (12) point out that “understanding and
activating power is …. critical to strengthening health systems and improving health outcomes”, but also
understudied. Despite the growing recognition of power as a construct in implementation frameworks (2),
research seldom documents how organisational interventions in the front line of health systems shape or
confront existing power relations. The issue may be how to ‘see’ power, an ever present but latent
phenomenon that is discernable in texts and discourses and the relationships between actors (13), but
which becomes more visible during decision-making processes (14) or when seeking to change local
practices. Implementation research thus offers a unique opportunity to observe and document the role of
power in health systems.
This paper responds to the call for more analyses of power (12, 15), speci cally examining its role as a
factor in implementation of a health service intervention in South Africa. The intervention concerns an
initiative to strengthen accountability for and responsiveness to maternal, neonatal and child deaths in a
rural district of South Africa, with the local catchment area of a district hospital and surrounding primary
health care clinics and community based services as the basic unit of intervention and analysis. A mixed
methods, retrospective evaluation was conducted in the district along with three others targeted by the
intervention in 2017, the  ndings of which are described elsewhere (11, 16, 17).
For this paper, interview data were purposefully selected for further analysis from three local catchment
areas in one of the districts representing the range (low, moderate and high) of commitment to the
intervention. We explore the forms of individual and collective power in the three units in order to shed
light on power as a factor in variable implementation and, conversely, the ways in which the intervention
itself (explicitly or implicitly) shaped power relations. From this analysis, we seek to draw conclusions on
how a better understanding of power may not only help to explain variation in adoption, but also support
the development of interventions that promote empowerment as a key element of their designs.
Methods
Design
A retrospective, qualitative embedded case study of expressions of power during the implementation of a
health service intervention in three catchment areas (‘implementing units’) of a rural South African
district.
Setting and intervention
One of  ve districts in a northern province of the country, the study district contains farming areas, small
towns and a signi cant ‘mineral-energy’ complex of mines and coal- red power stations. At the time of
data collection (2017), the district population was around 750,000, the overwhelming majority of whom
relied on public health services. Health services are provided in  ve sub-districts through a mix of
hospital, primary health and community based services (Table 1).
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Table 1
District pro le at time of evaluation (2017)
Population ~ 750,000
Population density 15.5 people/km2
% dependent on the public sector for health care 92.3%
Sub-districts 5
Public health sector facilities 1 Regional Hospital
7 District Hospitals
64 PHC facilities
14 Ward Based Outreach
Teams
Per capita annual PHC expenditure in public health system
(2016/17)
R837 (US$58)
The district was targeted, with others, by the national Department of Health because of high under-5 and
neonatal mortality levels, considered to be retarding progress towards achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals. In late 2013, a skilled facilitator, who had previously steered programme
implementation as a senior manager in another province, was appointed to support the district. From
2014 onwards, he visited the district once a month, scaling down to every two months after three years.
Key elements of the facilitator-led intervention were new coordination structures, established in each of
seven catchment areas (district hospital and surrounding facilities), referred to as Monitoring and
Response Units (MRU); a system of real-time (48 hour) death reporting, review and response; outreach
support from district clinicians and managers; and distribution of evidence-based guidelines. Participants
in the MRU, which met monthly, were line managers (referred to as “drivers”), clinician managers
(“experts”) and programme managers and information o cers (“navigators”), spanning the district
hospital, primary health care and community based services. In this regard, the MRU speci cally sought
to leverage coordinated action on MNCH within the catchment area, crossing o cial reporting lines which
ran in parallel up to the district level. A key principle of the intervention strategy was that no additional
funding or external support was to be sourced and that it would rely entirely on better use of existing
resources.
By 2017, fairly steep declines in cause-speci c under- ve mortality, most notably for severe acute child
malnutrition, had been recorded in the routine information system of the district, widely attributed by
district actors to the effects of the MRU and associated support from district clinicians. The role of the
MRU as an intervention in district governance and accountability and the plausible pathways through
which it enabled these improved health outcomes are described elsewhere (11).
Sampling and data collection
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Although the MRU was a deliberate system strengthening intervention, it was never set up with research
or evaluation in mind. Anecdotal evidence prompted interest from an independent research team (the co-
authors), who conducted a post-hoc evaluation three years after the start of implementation. In late 2016,
the researchers began observing MRU meetings, reviewed available documents and interviewed the
intervention facilitator. From the initial data gathered, key intervention stakeholders were identi ed and an
intervention ‘programme theory’ developed, which formed the basis of further data gathering. In April
2017, the co-authors spent a week in the study district conducting a total of 44 interviews with district
and sub-district stakeholders. A sub-set of interviews from three MRU catchment areas (hereafter referred
to as ‘implementing units’) forms the basis of the analysis presented in this paper. The three
implementing units were purposefully selected by district programme managers as representing the
spectrum (rather than average) of MRU functioning (high, moderate and low) at the time of the
evaluation. The subjective approach to selection was adopted as more objective criteria, such as
performance data, failed to reveal any clear patterns.
The three district hospitals ranged in size from 80–143 beds, and were in referral relationships with 8–16
primary health care clinics. A total of 34 actors in the three selected implementing units was interviewed
(Table 2). Interviews were set up through the hospital Chief Executive O cer (CEO) with the request to
approach the key constituents of the MRU, namely senior and mid-level hospital managers (CEO, nursing
service manager, medical manager, maternity and paediatric ward managers, dietitians), primary health
care managers, information o cers and community outreach team coordinators. The research team
worked in pairs, and spent at least one full day in each hospital conducting interviews. Interviews were
guided by the programme model, and elements probed included, amongst others, understanding, buy-in
to and perceived functioning of the MRU meetings and processes.
Table 2
Actors interviewed in three implementing units
Level N
Hospital managers (senior and middle) 20
Primary health care managers 8
Community-based teams 4
Other: emergency services, social worker 2
Total 34
Analysis of data
The original analysis of the full dataset followed the case study approach (18), namely, each unit was
 rst analysed separately and then combined with the others in the district, which was then compared with
other districts. A detailed description of the original analysis is described elsewhere (11). Subsequent,
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secondary analyses have explored speci c mechanisms of change, drawing on theories of enabling
environments (17) and governance (11). This paper is the last in this series, speci cally focusing on actor
power.
For the power analysis, interviews from the three implementing units were re-analysed,  rst by listening to
the audio recordings (noting the emotional tone of the interview), followed by immersive re-reading of
transcripts, then further coding of data into forms of power. ‘Power over’ was taken as the exercise of
formal hierarchical authority in the implementation process; ‘power to’ as perceived knowledge and skills
in completing work tasks; ‘power within’ as individualised expressions of autonomy or agency, namely
“the ability to make things happen through their own actions” (1); and power ‘with’ as evidence of
collective action (joint meetings across spheres, subjective reports coordinated action – formal and
informal; linked or not to MRU). Manifestations of power and support for the MRU amongst individual
senior, middle and frontline managers were also mapped in a modi ed stakeholder analysis (19) of each
implementing unit. The three units are referred to in the analysis as ‘full’, ‘moderate’ and ‘low’
implementing units, respectively. As the subject matter could be considered politically sensitive, the
names of district and catchment areas are deliberately withheld and identifying data kept to a minimum.
In the four years since the evaluation was done, there has been turnover of staff in the three catchment
sites and the likelihood of quotes being linked to individuals are minimal.
The Standards for Reporting Qualitative Research (SRQR) Checklist is provided as additional  le 1 (20).
Results
Table 3 presents the thematically organised qualitative data, further summarised in the narrative below.
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Table 3
Expressions of power in high, moderate and low MRU implementing units






14 (plus a group meeting) 13 7
Collective
buy-in
- “…one would not hesitate to say
that this was one of the best
initiatives” (CEO)
- “…We cannot do without it.
Because it is so important. If it
comes to this issue of maternal
death, stillbirth rate, the MRU has
helped us a lot. Yes. So we really
appreciate this MRU programme
and we are taking it with two
hands.” (maternity OM)
- ”… this program, I love it...”
(paediatric OM)
- “…hundred percent I can
recommend it.” (dietitian)
- ”…I think the MRU
is keeping us on our
toes.” (NSM)
- “I like the MRU, I
enjoy it and I think it
is yielding results.”
(PHC LAM 1)
"… when I weigh the
pros and cons, we
better go with it…it's
one helluva job, but
believe me, it is
worth it." (PHC LAM
2)



















there isn't a lot of buy-




so it was like a
duplication of
activities… it's taking
us away from the
focal point of patient
care.” (maternity OM)
" I don’t know, but I
don't think it will be
sustainable"(paediatric
OM)
Abbreviations: OM: operational manager; LAM: local area manager; CEO: chief executive o cer; NSM:
nursing service manager PHC: primary health care; WBOT: ward based outreach team
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Stable senior and middle
managers, active drivers of the
MRU
“… so I think we owe a lot to our
CEO in a sense that he buying in
to the idea and he is supporting
us.” (clinical manager)
“we do have a distributive
leadership” (CEO)
High turnover of




“I heard our CEO -
he is still new - I
heard him saying I
need to attend this
MRU because when
we say it, it's like























Lack of induction of
new staff who “…don’t
quite understand the
value of MRU or what
their role is for that
matter.” (clinician)
Chairing of MRU
meetings was “just a
matter of whoever is
available” (dietitian)
Abbreviations: OM: operational manager; LAM: local area manager; CEO: chief executive o cer; NSM:
nursing service manager PHC: primary health care; WBOT: ward based outreach team
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“it was one of the poor
performing hospitals in the entire
district. But like now, it’s one of
the best.” (paediatric OM)
“Those who form part of this I
think they are empowered,
because now you can see
everybody is improving, even in
their daily jobs they are active.
They know what to do. And they
know what to follow, what















would want to go to
the bottom of what
happened.” (PHC
LAM 1)
“I think it is really
helping because …
now in paeds for
pneumonia no
death, I don’t know
for how long,
diarrhoea, no death,
there no death from
malnutrition I think,
ja one, you see it
can be one at times
it is zero, zero”
(information o cer)
"if we have one death,
we sit down with the
doctor, we must  nd
out what is the cause,





clinic, check road to
health booklet,
casualty, up to the















Abbreviations: OM: operational manager; LAM: local area manager; CEO: chief executive o cer; NSM:
nursing service manager PHC: primary health care; WBOT: ward based outreach team
Page 11/22






Ability to engage powerful
players:
“I had constant meetings with the
staff at X Clinic, because there
were about six mid-wives who
resigned, and … the management
of the clinic then said no, we are
downgrading the hours to 12
hours. We then said no, let's
engage the district. The district
said unfortunately there was a
moratorium and I said no, let's
write the motivation directly to the
o ce of the MEC [provincial
minister of health], and she
approved that we can appoint the
people” (CEO)
Perceived equality:
“Don't come and think that you
[the CHWs] are subordinate to
anybody. You are part of the
team, whatever suggestion you
have, because you are the people
that have a direct contact with the





are in a situation
like this one, pick up
the phone whether it
is weekend, it’s
during the night; call
the DCST [district
clinical specialist
team] if you can.”
(NSM)
“…I realized this
would end up being
a maternal death,




contact the CEO”, so
I called the CEO, so
eventually they
accepted the patient
and then she was
well.” (maternity
OM)
“…now what I do,
after checking [the
data], and then I will
sit down with them,
all of them and then








"I am free to innovate,
start projects… many
people who have
practice the years I
have are bored with
their practice because
they do one and the
same thing over and
over. So me, I am not
bored with my job,






“in my view sustaining
MRU while we are
doing [other mortality









“So I think that, that teamwork
that is there, that is making
everyone come in to want to
contribute to the betterment of
this community as far as health









pick up the phone
quickly and then
talk to their partners
their colleagues in
Inter-professional:





team", the young ones,
it's doctors and allied
support staff… they
have those open days
Abbreviations: OM: operational manager; LAM: local area manager; CEO: chief executive o cer; NSM:
nursing service manager PHC: primary health care; WBOT: ward based outreach team
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Factor Full implementing unit Moderate
implementing unit
Low implementing unit
“I think it’s the integration
between PHC and the hospital.
We’ve got an open relationship
with each other. You know, if
they’ve got a problem at the clinic
they will tell you, listen, we’ve got
a problem, this is what happened
and then it will be  xed” (PHC
OM)
Collective mindsets:
“to be able to have a similar
understanding of the primary goal
of the whole picture of PHC and
the hospital. Because, without it,
without the two linked together
you wouldn’t be able to achieve
what we are able to achieve as far
as MRU is concerned.” (clinical
manager)
Shared resources:
“I mobilised my maintenance
team and said, for the coming
two weeks, you just take the car
and go to the clinics, make your
own assessment of the facilities.
You know, those things that you
can do immediately. And those
that need replacement like
ceilings, then you can just write
the motivation – I'll take it to
district so the district can assist
with the resources” (CEO)
“at hospital, not a long while back
they were, in need of... surgical…
consumables, then at the clinics
we will send them to the hospital.
Next time we are short of things
they will help us...” (PHC OM)
the clinics so it
helps us to be able
to care completely
for our patients. … it

























data to be just as
one presentation.”
(PHC LAM2)
but they go into
communities and
address teenagers and
try to role model...”
(maternity OM)
Hospital and PHC:
"The dietitians in the
hospital and the feeder











teams] to be part of
MRU.” (maternity OM)
"Last month, we had
very decreased
admissions in the
ward, and they were
saying eh-eh our BUR
[bed utilisation rate] is
going down, as if we
are not working… BUR
is going down because
PHC is doing their
work… but if we are




Abbreviations: OM: operational manager; LAM: local area manager; CEO: chief executive o cer; NSM:
nursing service manager PHC: primary health care; WBOT: ward based outreach team
Collective buy-in and variable implementation
The variable implementation across the three units was con rmed in interviewee accounts of buy-in to
MRU, as well as in the ease of doing  eldwork and willingness of respondents (especially senior
managers) to engage with the research. In the full implementation unit (IU), the CEO indicated that “one
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would not hesitate to say that this was one of the best initiatives”. This sentiment was echoed by other
key members of the MRU, who also spoke about it in effusive terms: “… we cannot do without it”
(maternity manager), “… we love it…” (paediatric ward manager).1 The interviewees from the moderate IU,
most of whom came from the middle and frontline manager ranks, were more muted in their appraisal,
while still expressing support for the initiative (“I think the MRU is keeping us on our toes”), and indicating
that MRU meetings were held monthly “without fail”. In contrast, in the low IU, the tone of interviews was
mostly one of disengagement, with one respondent openly resisting the MRU. Here the MRU was not
perceived to be adding value to established processes of mortality review, and interviewees were of the
opinion that the MRU was unlikely to be sustained once the facilitator no longer visited. The research
team was able to interview only 7 MRU actors in this IU, and of these, the dietitian was the only one who
could be described as enthusiastic. This was possibly because the MRU had speci cally enabled a new
focus on child malnutrition and had sought to elevate the role of dietitians in the district.
Exercise of formal authority (power over)
The stability, degree of involvement and support of senior managers was strikingly different in the three
units, and clearly impacted on implementation – in the full IU the MRU meetings were chaired by the CEO
or the clinical manager, and processes were steered by a combination of senior and middle managers, in
a model of leadership described as “distributed” by the CEO. In the moderate IU, there had been leadership
turnover, both of CEOs (three in three years) and the clinical manager during the implementation period.
The MRU was, however, held together by a critical mass of stable senior and mid-level nursing leadership
– the senior nursing services manager (NSM), managers in maternity and paediatric wards, and
clinic/primary health care managers (referred to as local area managers - LAMs). The newly appointed
CEO was also reported as expressing interest in the MRU initiative. In the low IU, turnover was more
extensive, involving senior and middle managers in both the hospital and PHC services, who had been
replaced by ‘acting’ managers with reportedly low engagement in the work of the MRU. Chairing of
meetings was delegated to lower level managers (“whoever is available”), usually the dietitian or one of
the ward managers.
Self-e cacy (power to)
With respect to perceived knowledge and skills in completing work task, interviewees in all three IUs
expressed a degree of self-e cacy in their ability to respond to maternal, neonatal and child deaths. The
actors in the full IU were described as “empowered” and understood that they had become a “best
practice” site. Similarly, in the moderate IU, a sense of self-e cacy was gained from continual processes
of learning, and ability to “get to the bottom of problems” and most importantly, reduce mortality. The
information o cer in this IU – a university graduate – played a key role as the steward of information for
the team. In the low IU, structured mortality audits and ongoing support from district clinical specialist
teams (along with dietitians) was perceived to have contributed to declining in-hospital mortality from
severe acute malnutrition in children. The maternity nursing manager described long standing quality
improvement efforts in the hospital including “encouraging companionship” during delivery.2
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Expressions of agency (power within)
Expressions of agency or ‘power within’ were most evident in accounts of how actors bypassed the
o cial reporting lines to address problems and successfully navigated hierarchies to meet patient and
staff needs. In the moderate IU, for example, senior and mid-level nursing managers described how they
would not hesitate to engage the district clinical specialist team or the CEO of the referral facility in cases
of an emergency; and the information o cer could name and shame a group of unit managers who
submitted poor quality data reports. In the full IU, the CEO had managed to secure additional midwife
posts for primary health care facilities by appealing directly to the provincial minister of health – jumping
over multiple layers of the bureaucracy and challenging hiring freezes. Agency was also re ected in other
ways - the freedom to innovate described by the dietitian, the resistance to the MRU expressed by the
maternity manager in the low IU and a discourse of equality by a ward based (community) outreach team
leader in the full IU. The tone of the interviews – passive, fatalistic vs engaged, motivated – also provided
an indirect means to judge agency.
Relationships, team work, collective action (power with)
Expressions of ‘power with’ in the IUs were related to inter-professional team work (particularly within the
hospital setting), but more signi cantly to the existence of collaborative relationships between hospitals
and primary health care services (including community based services), which normally have separate
reporting lines to the district. In the full IU these relationships extended beyond open communication and
common visions, also present in the moderate IU, to include mutual sharing of material resources. There
was a powerful local norm of everyone pulling together. In the low IU, instances of collective action were
more fragmented – such as community outreach activities by hospital teams and collaboration between
dietitians in the hospital and clinics. At a managerial level there was a disconnect – and even
antagonism – between the hospital and PHC services. For example, attendance by community-based
staff in mortality review meetings was considered inappropriate; and if PHC services performed well this
meant fewer admissions in the paediatric ward and a reduced bed utilisation rate, and the risk of staff
being accused of “not working”.
Stakeholder analysis
Figure 1 is a modi ed stakeholder analysis of the three units, summarising the positions of selected key
senior, middle and frontline managers in the hospital and PHC sevices on the MRU and the degree
(subjectively rated by the authors on a 3 point scale of >,>>,>>>) and forms of power they embodied as
individuals (power over, to, and within). These ratings were derived from a triangulated assessment of
their own and other interviewee accounts. Frontline (or hybrid) managers were de ned as those
overseeing and providing clinical care, middle managers as those supporting frontline managers and
senior managers as overseeing middle managers.
In the full IU, there was buy-in to the MRU across the board and willingness of senior managers (with
‘power over’) to drive the initiative. Nodes of ‘power to’ and ‘power within’ were present amongst other
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levels of managers, and straddled the hospital, primary health care and support services. In the moderate
IU, distributed support and power were also evident but to a lesser degree. In the low IU, there was no
obvious support for the intervention amongst senior hospital and PHC managers, only one obvious
proponent in the hospital’s middle management, and one node of active resistance.
21
Discussion
The starting point for this analysis was the relevance of power as a factor in implementation of health
service interventions. Similar to other studies (13), the Veneklasen and Miller de nition and typology
proved useful for identifying and characterising power relations in the context of the intervention. The
 ndings suggest that forms of power (or their absence) and their distribution may explain variation in
implementation, while conversely, interventions need to recognise how they engage and shape power
relations in diverse ways. As Langley and Denis (21) point out “however rational and reasonable they
may appear on paper, quality improvement initiatives, like other forms of organisational innovation, will
fail unless they are designed and implemented in such a way as to take into account the pattern of
interests, values and power relationships that surround them.”
The willingness of those in a hierarchical line authority (power over) to endorse and drive implementation
is regarded as a necessary condition for adoption and implementation at other levels (3). Indeed, the
stability and buy-in of the senior managers varied signi cantly in the three units, with wholesale
endorsement by the leadership team in the full IU enabling integration of MRU processes into
organisational practice still evident some four years later. The situation in the moderate IU is interesting –
here one strong node of support from a stable senior nursing manager, in alliance with middle level and
frontline managers in the hospital wards and PHC services, was su cient to ensure successful
implementation. However, in a wider context of high managerial turn over, the reliance on a single driver in
the senior management team meant that the intervention was vulnerable in this unit. The MRU failed to
gain traction in the low IU where the intervention was perceived as neither necessary nor of added value –
a situation of low ‘change valence’ (22).
Beyond formal leadership endorsement, the analysis also highlighted the role of perceived self-e cacy
(power to) and agency (power within) as enabling positive action in local health systems. Senior
managers who combined line authority with these attributes were able to create signi cant decision-
space (23) around themselves, evident in the ability to mobilise additional resources and advance local
collective action in the full IU. The presence of these capacities in middle managers (as brokers) and
frontline clinicians (as champions) was manifest in the way they engaged senior managers and in their
critiques and narratives of resistance, highlighting the distributed nature of power (24, 25). Overt
expressions of power by lower level players are not without risk, and in the examples identi ed appeared
to re ect not only actor agency (power within) but also a tacit understanding (‘know how’/‘know when’) of
how to manoevre within organisational hierarchies.
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The ways in which the MRU intervention shaped power relations are described in detail elsewhere (11).
Principally, the MRU created a new meso-level governance mechanism that sought to widen participation
and accountability in decision-making, across managerial layers, professional boundaries, and levels of
the health system. The most signi cant achievement of the MRU was widely seen as its ability to
mobilise collective action (power with) in a local service delivery unit. In the process, the MRU intervention
also  attened hierarchies and created new ‘invited spaces’ (26) and mandates for clinicians, middle
managers and frontline players to take action on issues related to maternal, neonatal and child health
(power to). However, the MRU and other quality interventions premised on collective and responsive
decision-making in local health systems could be viewed as a challenge to hierarchical forms of ‘power
over’ (especially at higher levels) and as therefore inherently political (21, 27). While greater participation
may lead to widening of support for an intervention amongst middle and frontline players, as in the case
of the MRU, these interventions may not survive if power relations at higher levels – in this case district
and provincial levels - are not also recast in more enabling ways (28).
Limitations
A retrospective analysis such as this, derived largely from interviews and seen through the lens of one
intervention, is not able to disentangle the cause-effect relationships between power and implementation.
It is plausible that a priori power relations shaped the variable adoption and implementation of the
intervention across the three units, even if the intervention itself shifted relations of power (expressed
most concretely in the idea of “empowerment”). However, a high turnover of senior managers in two of
the units hinted at complex underlying dynamics, whose understanding would have required a more
sustained engagement. In-depth research in a neighbouring province, for example, found that fractious
engagements between managers and organised labour were often the source of breakdowns in the
‘negotiated order’ of the local health service (29). Relationships between the health service and
community systems represent a key additional interface of power not addressed in this study (30).
The de nitions of the forms of power used in this paper are subject to varying interpretations and there is
debate as to whether they are completely distinct or overlapping constructs – such as between ‘power to’
and ‘power within’ (28). Other studies may operationalise these constructs differently. Similarly, it was not
possible to determine how the different forms of power were related to each other and emerged over time,
for example, whether power ‘within’ followed power ‘with’ and ‘to’ or vica versa. Such an understanding
would require prospective designs that carefully track unfolding forms and expressions of power over
time.
Conclusions
This paper has shown how a systematic analysis of power may provide insights into implementation
processes, and the need to recognise that health service interventions engage power, especially those
interventions that seek to widen participation and responsiveness in local health systems. A
differentiated approach to analysing forms of power, as adopted in this study, provides the basis for
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considering the exercise of power as both a productive and a constraining force. This approach also
enables an understanding of power as distributed, exercised by multiple actors in a variety of ways.
Interventions that redistribute power (or ‘empower’) in health systems may facilitate ownership but may
also be seen as challenging power relations at other levels, and impede sustainability. Implementation
actors thus need to recognise the inherently political nature of their work, and the political leadership
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